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TRAINING AND UNION WAGES
Christian Dustmann and Uta Scho ¨nberg*
Abstract—This paper investigates whether unions, through imposing
wage ﬂoors that lead to wage compression, increase on-the-job training.
Our analysis focuses on Germany. Based on a model of unions and
ﬁrm-ﬁnanced training, we derive empirical implications regarding appren-
ticeship training intensity, layoffs, wage cuts, and wage compression in
unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms. We test these implications using ﬁrm
panel data matched with administrative employee data. We ﬁnd support
for the hypothesis that union recognition, via imposing minimum wages
and wage compression, increases training in apprenticeship programs.
I. Introduction
T
HIS paper addresses the question of how labor market
institutions, in particular minimum wages imposed by
unions, affect on-the-job training through wage compres-
sion. Our empirical investigation focuses on Germany,
which provides an interesting context for this analysis. First,
Germany has a large institutionalized youth training pro-
gram, the German apprenticeship system,1 training about
65% of each cohort of labor market entrants. Training is
mostly in general skills, and ﬁnanced partly by ﬁrms.2
Second, Germany’s collective bargaining system provides a
unique opportunity for testing the hypothesis that unions
increase training.
The German system differs in many aspects from those in
the United States and United Kingdom. Most importantly, in
Germany, union agreements are binding only in ﬁrms that
belong to an employer federation (Arbeitgeberverband),
and extend to all workers, regardless of whether they are
union members. Firm membership in an employer federa-
tion is voluntary. In the late 1990s, an average of 44% of all
ﬁrms did not belong to an employer federation. However,
larger ﬁrms are more likely to join an employer federation,
so only 27% of the workforce was not covered by union
agreements (own calculations based on the IAB establish-
ment panel, years 1995–1999). A second important feature
of the German collective bargaining system is that union
wages act as minimum wages. Payment above the union
wage appears to be common. In the late 1990s, about 48%
of all ﬁrms that recognized a union paid (to some employ-
ees) wages above the union wage. On average, wages paid
above the union wage were about 10% higher than the union
wage (own calculations based on the IAB establishment
panel, years 1995–1999).
To guide the empirical analysis, we ﬁrst develop a model
of ﬁrm-ﬁnanced training. Our point of departure is the work
by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a, 1999b, 2003), Booth and
Chatterji (1998), and Booth, Francesconi, and Zoega
(2003). In contrast to these models, in our model a union-
ized and a nonunionized sector coexist. The difference
between the two sectors is that ﬁrms in the unionized sector
have to pay at least the union wage, while ﬁrms in the
nonunionized sector are allowed to pay a lower wage. This
mirrors the key features of the German collective bargaining
system. We further extend the existing models of unions and
training by allowing for endogenous worker mobility after
training, as well as by allowing for worker heterogeneity.
Our empirical analysis begins with a test of the main
assumption of our model: wages are more compressed in
unionized than in nonunionized ﬁrms. This paper thus also
adds to the large literature on how unions affect the wage
structure. Our matched employer-employee data allow us to
go beyond what has been possible for the United States and
United Kingdom. In particular, we are able to condition on
ﬁrm ﬁxed effects when comparing the variance of log-
wages and education wage differentials in unionized and
nonunionized ﬁrms. Our results support the hypothesis that
wages are more compressed in unionized than in nonunion-
ized ﬁrms.
A more compressed wage structure in unionized ﬁrms
should lead to more ﬁrm-ﬁnanced training in those ﬁrms. In
the second step of the empirical analysis, we investigate
differences in apprenticeship training between unionized
and nonunionized ﬁrms. The key issue here is that there is
selection of workers and possibly ﬁrms into the unionized
sector. Our identiﬁcation strategy exploits the changes in
union status over time, allowing us to control for unob-
served time-invariant ﬁrm (and worker) heterogeneity, and
uses ﬁrms that do not change union status to control for
common time effects. We seek to eliminate changes in
workforce and ﬁrm quality by conditioning on a rich set of
observables. Our empirical evidence is compatible with our
hypothesis that membership of ﬁrms in employer federa-
tions increases training in apprenticeship programs.3
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1 See for instance Soskice (1994), Franz and Soskice (1995), and
Winkelmann (1997) for a detailed description of the German apprentice-
ship system.
2 Typically, apprentices spend four days a week in a ﬁrm, receiving
training in their chosen occupation, and one day a week at state-run
schools. The training period lasts between two and three years, and ﬁrms
may lay off apprentices after training without costs. See studies by
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b) and Beicht, Herget, and Walden (2004),
among others, on the cost of training apprentices.
3 For the United Kingdom, studies by Bo ¨heim and Booth (2004), Booth
et al. (2003, 2006) and Green, Machin, and Wilkinson (1999) also indicate
that workers covered by union agreements receive more training. For
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novel implications that are unique to our model and thus
help to distinguish it from existing models of unions and
training. Both implications are a direct consequence of wage
ﬂoors that are binding in unionized ﬁrms, but not in non-
unionized ﬁrms. First, wage ﬂoors should prevent unionized
ﬁrms from cutting wages in case of a negative productivity
shock—at least for workers earning a wage equal or close to
the union wage. We thus expect wage cuts to occur less
frequently in unionized than in nonunionized ﬁrms. Second,
there should be more layoffs in unionized than in nonunion-
ized ﬁrms: Since unionized ﬁrms are not allowed to pay
wages below the union wage, they lay off workers who turn
out to be less productive than the union wage. We ﬁnd
support for both implications.
Overall, the empirical evidence is compatible with our
hypothesis that membership of ﬁrms in employer federa-
tions leads to wage compression and increases training in
apprenticeship programs.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II
develops a model of employer-ﬁnanced training. Section III
describes the data sources and samples we use. Section IV
presents estimation results, and section V concludes with a
discussion of our ﬁndings.
II. A Model of Firm-Financed Training
We begin by developing a model of union agreements
and ﬁrm-ﬁnanced training. The crucial feature of our model
is the coexistence of unionized and nonunionized sectors.
The difference between the two sectors is that ﬁrms in the
unionized sector have to pay at least the union wage, while
ﬁrms in the nonunionized sector can pay a lower wage.
In order to focus on the impact of union agreements on
training, we abstract from other reasons for wage compres-
sion and ﬁrm-ﬁnanced training, such as complementarity
between general and ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills (Acemoglu &
Pischke, 1999b; Franz & Soskice, 1995), and asymmetric
information between incumbent and outside ﬁrms (Acemo-
glu & Pischke, 1998).4
A. Setup
There are many workers and ﬁrms, and both are risk
neutral. Firms maximize expected proﬁts, and workers max-
imize expected utility. We consider two periods, where the
ﬁrst period is the training period. There is no discounting in
our model.
Unlike existing models of unions and training, such as
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b), our model allows for
worker heterogeneity. As we will see below, this implies
that a unionized and nonunionized sector coexists in equi-
librium. Workers’ productivity y in period 2 depends not
only on the amount of training received in period 1, but also
on their (true) ability, y  h(). We assume that human
capital h() is strictly increasing, differentiable, and concave
in training  (that is, h ()  0) and that h() 1 for  0.
The productivity of an untrained worker is  (that is, h(0) 
1). For simplicity, we assume that the productivity of
workers in training is the same as that of untrained workers.
We denote the variable cost of training by c() and assume
that c() is strictly increasing, differentiable, and convex
(that is, c() 0) with c(0)  c(0)  0. We further assume
that the ﬁrm’s production function exhibits constant returns
to scale, in other words, the total productivity of a ﬁrm is
equal to the sum of each worker’s productivity. A worker’s
ability  is drawn from a normal distribution with mean  
and variance 
2.
Information about ability is imperfect. In the ﬁrst period,
ﬁrms and workers receive a noisy signal  ˜ 	ε, which
they use to update their beliefs about a worker’s ability. If ε
is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance  ˜
2, then
the updated belief about the worker’s productivity is also
normally distributed (DeGroot, 1970), and a weighted av-
erage of the prior mean,  , and the signal,  ˜. We denote this
updated belief by  ˆ. Let F1(/ ˆ) denote the ability distri-
bution of a worker with expected ability  ˆ. In the second
period, both incumbent and outside ﬁrms fully get to know
worker ability. The assumption that ﬁrms perfectly learn
about worker ability is not essential for our results.
In the ﬁrst period, ﬁrms—as opposed to workers—decide
how much training to offer to a worker. Training is contin-
uous, and ﬁrms can condition their investment decision on
workers’ expected ability. We analyze the ﬁrm’s decision to
train under the assumption that ﬁrms can commit to only
providing training, but not to the amount of training. This is
what Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b) refer to as the con-
strained regime. For our particular application, this assump-
tion seems reasonable. Trainees take centralized exams at
the end of the apprenticeship period and receive a certiﬁ-
cate. Hence, it is clearly veriﬁable whether a worker has
received some apprenticeship training. However, an impor-
tant part of apprenticeship training takes place inside the
ﬁrm—which is not easily veriﬁable by outside parties, even
if it is observable.
Unlike existing models of unions and training, we allow
for endogenous worker mobility at the end of the training
period.As inAcemoglu and Pischke (1998), we assume that
during the training period workers experience a utility shock

, capturing the worker’s ex post evaluation of her work
environment (such as nonmonetary personal perceptions of
the work environment, location, and colleagues). The
worker observes 
, but the ﬁrm does not. The utility shock
Canada, in contrast, Green and Lemieux (2007) conclude that unions have
little impact on training. Evidence on the impact of minimum wages on
training is mixed. WhileAcemoglu and Pischke (2003) andArulampalam,
Booth, and Bryan (2004) ﬁnd that minimum wages have no impact or
even increase training, Neumark and Wascher (2001) conclude that
minimum wages decrease training.
4 A further alternative explanation for wage compression is asymmetric
information with respect to workers and ﬁrms (see Autor, 2001, and
Bhaskar & Holden, 2002, for models of this type). For an alternative
approach, see Stevens (1994).
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 364is drawn from a distribution G with the probability density
function g and support [
 , 
 ], where 
   0. We assume that
G(.) belongs to the family of log-concave distribution func-
tions, i.e., g(
)/(l  G(
)), is non-decreasing in 
. We also
assume that the distribution of the utility shock depends on
neither ability nor training. The worker’s utility in period 2
at the incumbent ﬁrm, U, is a linear function of the incum-
bent ﬁrm’s wage offer, w, and the utility 
 from nonpecu-
niary job characteristics: U  w 	
 . The worker’s utility at
outside ﬁrms is equal to the wage offer, v.
In each period, ﬁrms simultaneously make wage offers to
workers by maximizing expected proﬁts. Wages are thus
determined in spot markets, and long-term wage contracts
are not feasible. We further impose the standard free-entry
condition on ﬁrms: no ﬁrm earns positive proﬁts in the long
run in equilibrium.
In addition to endogenous worker mobility, a key feature
that further distinguishes our model from those in the
existing literature is the coexistence of unionized and non-
unionized ﬁrms. In our model, the only difference between
these two types of ﬁrms is that unionized ﬁrms have to pay
at least the union wage (and may pay a higher wage) to
workers who are not in training. This assumption mirrors
the German collective bargaining system where union
wages act as minimum wages and payment above the union
wage is not uncommon. Since a nationwide minimum wage
does not exist in Germany, no wage ﬂoor is binding in
nonunionized ﬁrms. We further assume that ﬁrms can lay off
apprentices at the end of the training period without cost;
although ﬁring costs in Germany are generally quite high,
ﬁrms face no ﬁring costs at the end of apprenticeship
training. Finally, we assume that ﬁrms cannot switch union
status, and that a single union wage applies to trained and
untrained workers.5
We begin with wage determination in the second period
in unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms. We then turn to ﬁrms’
incentives to train and wage determination in the ﬁrst
period.
B. Wage Determination
Consider ﬁrst wage determination in outside ﬁrms. Due
to perfect competition in the outside market, outside ﬁrms—
regardless of their union status—bid up workers’wage until
it equals their (marginal) productivity, that is, v  y 
h().6
Next, consider nonunionized incumbent (training) ﬁrms.
Let w denote their wage offer. Incumbent ﬁrms set wages by
maximizing expected proﬁts, and trade off a higher chance
of attracting workers with a lower rent per worker.Aworker
stays with the training ﬁrm if the utility w 	
from staying
exceeds the utility v  y from moving. Hence, the proba-
bility of staying is Pr(stay)  Pr(
y  w)  1  G(y 
w). Incumbent ﬁrms therefore maximize
max
w
1  Gy  wy  w.
From the ﬁrst-order condition, w satisﬁes w  y  (1 
G(y  w))/g(y  w). Log-concavity of G guarantees that the
second-order condition for a maximum is satisﬁed. Since
workers stay with the incumbent ﬁrm with positive proba-
bility even if they receive a higher outside wage offer, ﬁrms
pay wages below productivity. It can be easily veriﬁed that
the wage offer of the nonunionized incumbent ﬁrms is equal
to the worker’s productivity minus a constant, w  y  .
Consequently, due to nonpecuniary job characteristics, non-
unionized ﬁrms earn (second period) rents on workers, but
the rent does not vary with the worker’s productivity. We
would like to stress that nonpecuniary job characteristics are
only one reason why ﬁrms may earn positive (second
period) proﬁts; other reasons include mobility costs and
search frictions. Our arguments would apply in such envi-
ronments as well.
Finally, consider unionized incumbent ﬁrms. Unlike non-
unionized ﬁrms, unionized ﬁrms have to pay at least the
union wage, w , and may offer a higher wage. Figure 1
illustrates how wage ﬂoors change the wage determination
process in unionized ﬁrms. In the ﬁgure, we consider
untrained and trained workers. The wage and productivity
of a worker are on the vertical axis, and her ability is on the
horizontal axis. Productivity and wages of untrained
(trained) workers in the absence of union agreements are
indicated by the panels ynt (yt) and wnt (wt). From our
previous arguments, they are equal to productivity minus a
constant, . The horizontal line indicates the union wage w .
The ﬁgure is drawn such that training increases the produc-
tivity of high-ability workers by more than that of low-
ability workers; however, this is not essential for our key
results.
Consider ﬁrst workers with productivity below the union
wage w . In the ﬁgure these are workers with ability below
1
t if trained and 1
nt if untrained. Unionized ﬁrms do not ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to employ these workers. Since there are no
ﬁring costs at the end of the apprenticeship, these workers
are laid off.7 Union agreements leave these workers worse
off.
5 Note that in Germany, unions and employer federations do not directly
bargain over training; see Bispinck (2001) and Bispinck, Dorsch-
Schweizer, and Kirsch (2002) for evidence.
6 Note, however, that unionized ﬁrms will not make a wage offer to
workers with a productivity below the union wage. Also note that since
outside wages equal productivity, there are no poaching externalities in
our model, as for instance discussed by Stevens (1994). To keep the model
as simple as possible, we also abstract from spillovers from the unionized
to the nonunionized sector, as for instance discussed by Fitzenberger and
Franz (1999).
7 Note that layoffs at the end of the training period occur because
employers acquire new information about workers’ ability during the
training period. If unionized ﬁrms had known workers’ ability in the ﬁrst
period, workers with an ability below 1
nt (1
t) would not have been hired.
TRAINING AND UNION WAGES 365Next, consider workers with a productivity above the
union wage, but whose wage in the absence of union
agreements falls below the union wage. In the ﬁgure, this
refers to all workers with ability between 1
t and 2
t if
trained, and between 1
nt and 2
nt if untrained. Unionized
incumbent ﬁrms would optimally like to offer a wage below
the union wage. As they are not allowed to do so, the best
they can do is to offer just the union wage. Hence, workers




nt) are paid the
union wage. These workers are better off because of unions,
and earn a higher wage than they would in the absence of
union agreements.
Finally, consider workers whose wage in the absence of
union agreements exceeds the union wage. In the ﬁgure this
applies to all workers with ability above 2
t if trained, and
above 2
nt if untrained. For these workers, the union wage is
not binding and they earn the same wage as in the absence
of union agreements. These workers are no better or worse
off because of unions.
Notice that wage ﬂoors lead to a compressed wage
structure in unionized ﬁrms: for workers in the middle range
of the ability distribution, ﬁrms earn higher proﬁts on more
productive workers.
C. Training
Next, we turn to the ﬁrm’s training decision in the ﬁrst
period. It is easy to see that nonunionized ﬁrms do not
ﬁnance training. Since ﬁrms cannot commit to training, the
only training level that workers consider credible is the one
that maximizes ﬁrms’ future proﬁts. Nonunionized ﬁrms
earn a rent of  on each retained worker. Since workers stay
with the incumbent ﬁrm with probability (1  G()), ﬁrms’
proﬁts in the second period equal (1  G()).
Clearly, proﬁts do not depend on training, and nonunionized
ﬁrms offer no training in equilibrium.
This is different in unionized ﬁrms. Figure 1 illustrates
why wage ﬂoors induce unionized ﬁrms to ﬁnance training.
Consider a worker whose realized ability is 1
nt. Without
training, the ﬁrm would make zero proﬁt on this worker.
With training, in contrast, the worker’s productivity in-
creases to yt, his wage increases to wt  yt  , and the ﬁrm
makes positive proﬁts. More generally, training increases
the rent on all workers with (realized) ability between 1
t
and 2
nt. Workers with ability below 1
t are less productive
than the union wage even after training. Workers with
ability above 2
nt are unaffected by union wages even with-
out training. Notice that this argument relies on ﬁrms
earning rents on workers; if wages were equal to a worker’s
(marginal) productivity, unions would have no impact on
training. Hence, while nonpecuniary job characteristics are
not sufﬁcient for ﬁrms to provide training, they are neces-
sary for unions to increase training.
Formally, let E[u(, ) ˆ] denote the expected second-
period proﬁt from employing a worker with expected ability
 ˆ. Unionized ﬁrms lay off workers with realized ability
below 1 and hence make zero proﬁts on these workers. For
FIGURE 1.—WAGE DETERMINATION IN UNIONIZED FIRMS
The ﬁgure illustrates wage determination in unionized ﬁrms. Workers with ability lower than 1
t (1




nt) earn the union wage
when trained (untrained).
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 366workers with (realized) ability between 1 and 2, unionized
ﬁrms earn a rent of y  w . These workers stay with the
unionized ﬁrm after apprenticeship completion with proba-
bility 1  G(y  w ). Finally, for workers with ability above












1  Gy  w y  w dF1/ ˆ
 1  F12 ˆ1  G.
The training level unionized ﬁrms offer,  ˜u, solves c( ˜u) 
E[u ( ˜u, ) ˆ]/. It is straightforward to show that E[u(,
) ˆ]/ 0, and hence  ˜u0. Compare this training level with
the socially optimal level, *. The socially optimal training
level equates the marginal cost of training with the marginal
return to training, and thus satisﬁes c(*)  E[h(*) ˆ]/.
It is easy to see that E[h(*) ˆ]/  E[u( ˜u) ˆ]/.
Hence, unionized ﬁrms offer a lower training level than the
socially optimal level.
It is important to stress that the training level unionized
ﬁrms choose depends on the worker’s expected ability. Note
from ﬁgure 1 that it is workers in the middle of the realized
ability distribution who are affected most by the wage ﬂoor.
Consequently, unions increase training most for workers in
middle of the expected ability distribution. Wage ﬂoors
hardly increase training for workers with very low and very
high expected ability: workers with a very low expected
productivity are likely to turn out to be less productive than
the union wage even with training; workers with a very high
expected ability are likely to be unaffected by the wage ﬂoor
even in the absence of training.
To close the model, we have to analyze the sorting of
workers into the unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms in the
ﬁrst period. A formal analysis is available from the authors
on request. Here, we only note that workers with a low
expected ability prefer to work in nonunionized ﬁrms. The
intuition for this result is simple: workers who will be paid
the union wage are better off, while workers who turn out to
be less productive than the union wage are worse off, when
working in the unionized sector. Workers with low expected
ability are likely to have a lower productivity than the union
wage, and thus choose to work in nonunionized ﬁrms. Since
union wages do not affect wage offers of the very able (see
ﬁgure 1), workers with very high expected ability are
essentially indifferent between joining the unionized or
nonunionized sector.
This argument also highlights why unionized and non-
unionized ﬁrms coexist in our model. This is due to worker
heterogeneity: while workers with low expected ability
prefer to work in the nonunionized sector, workers in the
middle range of the expected ability distribution are strictly
better off in the unionized sector.
How can we interpret the result that union wages increase
training in the economy? In our model, unionized ﬁrms
offer a particular type of a long-term wage contract: they
guarantee to pay at least the union wage in the future.
Although ﬁrms could offer such a contract without becom-
ing unionized, it may not be self-enforceable. Once training
is completed, ﬁrms have an incentive to deviate and pay a
lower wage than the agreed minimum wage. Hence, the role
unions play in our model is that they serve as a commitment
device. Unionized ﬁrms credibly signal to workers that they
will pay at least the agreed union wage in the future. This
then provides an incentive for ﬁrms to train workers, and
may improve welfare in the economy.8
Our empirical analysis begins with a test of the key
assumption of our model: wages are more compressed in
unionized than in nonunionized ﬁrms. We then turn to
differences in apprenticeship training between unionized
and nonunionized ﬁrms. In the third step of the empirical
analysis, we test two additional implications that are unique
to our model, and thus help to distinguish our model from
existing models. We describe our estimation strategy in
detail below.
III. Data Sources and Samples
Our empirical analysis is based on two primary data
sources. The ﬁrst is a panel of establishments9 (the IAB
establishment panel), collected by the Federal Employment
Ofﬁce in Nuremberg.10 The data contain a rich set of
background information on the ﬁrm and its workforce, such
as the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial situation, industry, geographical lo-
cation, the proportion of apprentices, and whether the ﬁrm
recognizes union wage agreements. The second data source
is an administrative data set based on social security
records, and provides information on individual workers,
including daily wages, age, sex, nationality, education, oc-
cupation, as well as whether the worker is in apprenticeship
training. Like most administrative data sets, data on wages
are top-coded at the highest level of earnings that are subject
to social security contributions. The two data sources can be
matched through an establishment identiﬁer. From these
two primary data sources, we construct three samples (A
through C).
Sample A is a panel of establishments over the period
1995–1999, obtained from the IAB establishment panel,
supplemented with information on the ﬁrm’s workforce,
obtained from the social security records. For the years 1996
to 1999, we are able to match to each establishment infor-
8 Unions as a commitment device have also been discussed by—among
others—Malcomson (1983), Hogan (2001), and, in the case of training,
Booth and Chatterji (1998).
9 For the remaining part of the paper, we use the terms establishments
and ﬁrms interchangeably.
10 See Ko ¨lling (2000) for a detailed description of the data.
TRAINING AND UNION WAGES 367mation on all workers who were employed at the ﬁrm at the
ﬁrst of July of each year. We restrict the empirical analysis
to West German ﬁrms in the private sector to ﬁrms outside
the agricultural sector. In Germany, ﬁrms can recognize the
union either by joining an employer federation (Arbeitge-
berverband), or by engaging in bilateral negotiations with
the union. In the ﬁrst case, union wages are negotiated at a
regional and industry level, typically on an annual basis.
The proportion of ﬁrms that bilaterally negotiate with
unions is relatively small: 7.3%, compared with 48% that
recognize industry-wide agreements (own calculations). We
deﬁne a unionized ﬁrm as a ﬁrm that either belongs to an
employer federation or engages in bilateral negotiations
with the union. Our results are similar for an alternative
deﬁnition that classiﬁes only ﬁrms that belong to an em-
ployer federation as unionized.
Sample B is a sample of all workers who were employed
full-time at a ﬁrm in the ﬁrm panel at the ﬁrst of July each
year, and who had less than eleven years of potential labor
market experience. We concentrate on young workers to
avoid the problem of top-coding. Workers in training are
excluded from this sample. We distinguish between three
skill groups: low-skilled workers who have no further train-
ing after secondary school, medium-skilled workers who
went through apprenticeship training after secondary
school, and workers who graduated from a college or a
university. There are 724,089 wage spells in our sample:
9.1% belong to low-skilled workers (those without postsec-
ondary education), 73.0% to medium-skilled workers (those
who completed an apprenticeship), and 17.9% to university
graduates. Overall, top-coding affects 5.7% of wage spells,
but only 0.39% for the low-skilled and 0.98% for the
medium-skilled workers. Censoring is most severe for uni-
versity graduates, where 27.6% of all wage spells are
top-coded. For this reason, we concentrate on low- and
medium-skilled workers where top-coding is negligible. For
5,422 individuals, key variables such as ﬁrm size, industry,
or union status are missing. This leaves us with 718,667
individuals, of whom 41,489 are observed in nonunionized
ﬁrms.
Sample C consists of all individuals who were employed
as an apprentice in the years 1996–1999 in any of the ﬁrms
in our ﬁrm panel. We are able to follow these workers from
labor market entry onward (even if labor market entry was
before 1996) until 2001. There are 174,320 individuals in
the sample that had at least one training spell in a ﬁrm that
we can identify as unionized or nonunionized. We exclude
25,263 individuals who start working as a low-skilled
worker before enrolling on an apprenticeship scheme. As
the data do not distinguish between interns and apprentices,
we consider an individual as an apprentice if she has been
observed for at least 450 consecutive days on a training
program, which eliminates 6,959 individuals. We further
exclude individuals who change ﬁrms during the training
period (35,185 individuals), as well as individuals who start
more than one apprenticeship (2,073 individuals). We end
up with a sample of 104,840 workers. Of those, 93,678 are
observed in at least one spell after the training period, with
89,676 individuals being trained in a unionized ﬁrm, and
4,002 individuals in a nonunionized ﬁrm.
IV. Empirical Analysis
A. Unionized versus Nonunionized Firms
Our empirical analysis begins with a descriptive over-
view of unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms. Table 1 com-
pares the incidence and amount of apprenticeship training
(panel A), key ﬁrm characteristics (panel B), as well as key
worker characteristics (panel C) in unionized and nonunion-
ized ﬁrms. Results are based on sample A, and entries are
weighted so that they are representative for ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst two rows in the table provide preliminary
evidence that unionized ﬁrms are indeed more likely to train
apprentices than nonunionized ﬁrms, just as our model
predicts. There is a clear difference in training provision
TABLE 1.—DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIONIZED AND NONUNIONIZED FIRMS
All Unionized Nonunionized
Mean StdD Mean StdD Mean StdD
Panel A: Training
Firm trains 26.90% 36.15% 15.46%
Proportion apprentices 4.89% 6.50% 2.91%
Panel B: Firm Characteristics
Size 17.02 120.79 23.66 159.44 8.82 32.96
Number of new hires 0.96 6.63 1.17 8.14 0.68 4.06
Proportion young ﬁrms ( 5) 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.44 0.34 0.47
Proportion old ﬁrms ( 30) 0.28 0.45 0.35 0.48 0.20 0.40
(Investment/worker)/1,000* 16.62 509.73 11.47 275.23 22.96 697.80
(Revenue/worker)/1,000* 374.70 1,640.66 443.98 1,951.81 286.37 1,119.46
Panel C: Worker Characteristics
Proportion qualiﬁed workers 47.24% 51.71% 41.70%
Ratio females 23.81% 24.22% 23.27%
Daily average wage* 102.08 45.84 106.25 42.81 96.74 48.94
The table compares observable ﬁrm and worker characteristics in unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms. Entries are weighted and representative for ﬁrms. Columns “StdD” report the standard deviation of the listed
variables.
*In 1996 German marks. Results are based on sample A.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 368between unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms, with 36.15% of
unionized ﬁrms, but only 15.46% of nonunionized ﬁrms
providing training (row 1). The second row compares the
fraction of employees that are apprentices in unionized and
nonunionized ﬁrms. Again, this fraction is far higher in
unionized ﬁrms (6.50%) than in nonunionized ﬁrms
(2.91%).11
In our formal model, we do not explicitly model hetero-
geneity between ﬁrms and thus the sorting of ﬁrms into the
unionized sector—this would be beyond the scope of our
paper. However, panel B in table 1 highlights that unionized
ﬁrms differ from nonunionized ﬁrms. The single most
important difference is ﬁrm size: the average workforce size
in unionized ﬁrms is about 24, compared with only 9 in
nonunionized ﬁrms. Unionized ﬁrms also have hired more
workers in the previous year, which may be explained by
their larger average size. The proportion of young ﬁrms
(younger than ﬁve years) is lower among unionized than
nonunionized ﬁrms, while the proportion of old ﬁrms (older
than thirty years) is larger among unionized ﬁrms—a ﬁnd-
ing that is similar to ﬁndings for other countries.12 Invest-
ment per worker is somewhat larger, while the revenue per
worker is somewhat smaller, in nonunionized than union-
ized ﬁrms.
In contrast to ﬁrm heterogeneity and ﬁrm sorting, our
model does take into account heterogeneity between work-
ers and the selection of workers into the unionized sector.
The ﬁndings in panel C are broadly consistent with the
prediction of our model that more able workers sort into
unionized ﬁrms: unionized ﬁrms employ more qualiﬁed
workers (51.71% versus 41.70%) and pay 9% higher wages.
The average fraction of women, in contrast, is similar in
unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms.
These differences in ﬁrm and worker characteristics cast
some doubt on whether a simple comparison in apprentice-
ship training between unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms
reﬂects a causal relationship. The remaining empirical anal-
ysis proceeds in three steps. First, we test for the key
assumption of our model that wages are more compressed in
unionized than in nonunionized ﬁrms. Unlike studies for the
United States and United Kingdom, we are able to condition
on ﬁrm ﬁxed effects when comparing the variance of log-
wages and education wage differentials in unionized and
nonunionized ﬁrms. In the second step, we revisit differ-
ences in apprenticeship training between unionized and
nonunionized ﬁrms, and address the endogenous selection
of both workers and ﬁrms into the unionized sector. Our
results so far are also compatible with alternative models of
unions and training, such as Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b,
2003) and Booth and Chatterji (1998).13 In the third step of
the empirical analysis, we test two additional implications
concerning wage cuts and layoffs in unionized and non-
unionized ﬁrms that are unique to our model, and thus help
to distinguish our model from existing models. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that provides direct
evidence on how unions affect wage cuts and layoffs using
individual-level data.14
B. Unions and Wage Compression
Are wages more compressed in unionized than in non-
unionized ﬁrms, as our model predicts? Table 2, panel A,
compares education wage differentials in unionized and
nonunionized ﬁrms. Results are based on sample B. To
control for observable ﬁrm and worker characteristics, we
condition on potential labor market experience and its
square, the log of ﬁrm size, a dummy for metropolitan area,
as well as year and industry dummies. We run separate
regressions for workers in the two types of ﬁrms. To deal
with censoring (which is a problem only for university
graduates; see section III), we estimate tobit models. The
education wage differential between the medium- and the
low-skilled is about 40% larger in nonunionized ﬁrms,
compared with about 30% for the education wage differen-
tial between university graduates and the medium-skilled.
These differences are highly signiﬁcant (see last pair of
columns).15 Next, we additionally condition on ﬁxed ﬁrm
effects, now exploiting only variation within ﬁrms. Due to
censoring, we focus on the low- and medium-skilled. The
wage differential between these two groups of workers
decreases in both types of ﬁrms, indicating that sorting of
workers into ﬁrms is important. However, the difference in
wage differentials continues to be large and statistically
signiﬁcant.
In panel B, we compare wage inequality, measured as the
variance of log-wages and log-wage residuals, in unionized
and nonunionized ﬁrms, for low- and medium-educated
workers. The results show that the total variance of log-
wages is about 30% to 40% higher in nonunionized than in
unionized ﬁrms, for both education groups.16 In the next
row we condition on workers and ﬁrm characteristics, and
present residual variances.Again, the variance of log-wages
is substantially larger in nonunionized than in unionized
ﬁrms. Next, we again compare the residual variance of
log-wages within ﬁrms, conditional on ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, in
unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms. The magnitude of the
within-ﬁrm log-wage variance is substantially smaller than
11 Beckmann (2002) reports similar results.
12 For instance, Machin (2000) establishes a similar relationship between
ﬁrm age and union recognition for the United Kingdom.
13 Note, however, that in these models either all ﬁrms are unionized
(Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999b; Booth & Chatterji, 1998), or a minimum
wage applies to all ﬁrms and workers. Consequently, these models do not
have direct implications for the wage structure in unionized and nonunion-
ized ﬁrms.
14 Medoff (1979) analyzes the impact of unions on layoffs and quits only
at the industry level.
15 This is in line with evidence for other countries. For instance, Card
(1996) and Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2004) ﬁnd that in the United
States, wage differences between skill groups tend to be compressed in the
union sector. Lemieux (1998) provides similar ﬁndings for Canada.
16 See for instance DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) for similar
evidence for the United States.
TRAINING AND UNION WAGES 369the overall residual variance for both unionized and non-
unionized ﬁrms, as we would expect. Nevertheless, the
difference between unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms re-
mains sizable and statistically signiﬁcant for both groups of
workers.
C. Unions and Training
Estimation strategy. In the previous section, we illus-
trate that there is strong evidence for a compressed wage
structure in unionized ﬁrms, relative to nonunionized ﬁrms.
But does that lead unionized ﬁrms to train more than
nonunionized ﬁrms, as our model predicts? Table 1 pro-
vided some preliminary evidence that it does: the proportion
of unionized ﬁrms that train at least one apprentice is
36.15%, but only 15.46% of nonunionized ﬁrms provide
training (row 1). The fraction of apprentices in unionized
and nonunionized ﬁrms is also much higher in unionized
ﬁrms (6.50%) than in nonunionized ﬁrms (2.91%).
However, table 1 also highlights that unionized and
nonunionized ﬁrms differ with respect to a wide variety of
ﬁrm and worker characteristics, suggesting that there is
nonrandom selection of ﬁrms and workers into the union-
ized sector. If the characteristics that determine the ﬁrms’
and workers’ sector choices are correlated with ﬁrms’ pro-
pensities to train workers, then a simple comparison of
mean training intensity in unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms
is misleading. One way to address the endogenous selection
of workers and ﬁrms into sectors would be an IV type
strategy that makes use of exogenous variation that allocates
ﬁrms to the unionized/nonunionized sector. Unfortunately,
we were not able to identify any allocation mechanism for
ﬁrms that is plausibly exogenous.
The avenue that we follow instead is to use variation in
union status within ﬁrms that change union recognition, that
is, that either change from being nonunionized to being
unionized, or vice versa. As a comparison group, and to
eliminate common time trends, we use ﬁrms that are union-
ized (or not unionized) over the entire period. More for-
mally, our estimation strategy can be described as follows.
Let Tjt denote apprenticeship training (that is, the proportion
of apprentices in the ﬁrm, or an indicator variable for
whether the ﬁrm trains) in ﬁrm j in period t. It depends on
the union status Uijt (being equal to 1 for ﬁrms that are
unionized, and 0 otherwise), common time effects 
t, the
quality of the ﬁrm’s workforce, and time-variant ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics jt, as well as time-invariant ﬁrm
effects fj (both deﬁned as deviations from the population
mean). Assuming linearity, this relationship can be written
as Tjt  a 	 jUjt 	
 t 	 jt 	 fj, where j is the effect of
unionization on training. Since our model predicts that the
impact of unions on training differs across workers, we
allow this parameter to be ﬁrm-speciﬁc, with j 	εj.
The parameter we seek to estimate is the difference in the
training intensity between unionized and nonunionized
ﬁrms for those ﬁrms that choose to become unionized
(which is a “treatment on the treated” effect): E(	
εj)Ujt  1) : T.
A difference-in-difference estimator that compares the
ﬁrm’s proportion of apprentices before and after unioniza-
tion, and uses ﬁrms that are never unionized as a control
TABLE 2.—WAGE COMPRESSION IN UNIONIZED AND NONUNIONIZED FIRMS
Panel A: Education Wage Differentials
Unionized Nonunionized Difference
Coef StdE Coef StdE Coef StdE
(a) Tobit N  677,178 N  41,489
Medium-low 0.204 (0.001) 0.347 (0.005) 0.143 (0.006)***
High-low 0.562 (0.001) 0.805 (0.005) 0.243 (0.006)**
(b) Within ﬁrm N  560,083 N  29,910
Medium-low 0.174 (0.001) 0.252 (0.004) 0.078 (0.005)**
Panel B: Variance of Log-Wages
Unionized Nonunionized Difference
Coef StdE Coef StdE Coef StdE
1: Low-skilled N  61,069 N  4,721
(a) Total variance 0.139 (0.002) 0.199 (0.005) 0.061 (0.005)**
(b) Residual variance 0.093 (0.001) 0.126 (0.002) 0.033 (0.004)**
(c) Within-ﬁrm variance 0.057 (0.001) 0.074 (0.003) 0.017 (0.003)**
1: Medium-skilled N  499,014 N  25,189
(a) Total variance 0.050 (0.001) 0.087 (0.001) 0.036 (0.002)**
(b) Residual variance 0.034 (0.001) 0.061 (0.001) 0.027 (0.001)**
(c) Within-ﬁrm variance 0.026 (0.001) 0.035 (0.001) 0.010 (0.001)**
Panel A, row (a), reports the medium-low-skilled as well as the high-low-skilled wage differential from a log-wage regression that additionally controls for potential labor market experience and its square, the
log of ﬁrm size, year dummies, a dummy for metropolitan area, thirteen industry dummies, gender, and foreign status. Due to wage censoring, we estimate tobit models. In row (b), we control for the same variables
and include ﬁxed ﬁrm effects; we delete the high-skilled from our sample due to wage censoring. In panel B, we report the variance of log-wages in unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms, separately for the low-skilled
(row 1) and medium-skilled (row 2). We ﬁrst show the total variance (row a), then the residual variance, where we again condition on potential labor market experience and its square, the log of ﬁrm size, year
dummies, a dummy for metropolitan area, thirteen industry dummies, gender, and ethnicity (row b). We ﬁnally include ﬁxed ﬁrm effects, and report the within-ﬁrm residual variance (row c). Results are based on
sample B.
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 E(jtUjt 
0). For the last terms to disappear, jt has to be mean
independent of Ujt, that is, changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks
jt must be the same for ﬁrms that change and do not change
union status. One reason for why this might be violated is
that—as suggested by our model—ﬁrms that join the union
now attract more able workers, and thus increase training.
We deal with these concerns by conditioning on a large set
of observable ﬁrm and worker characteristics. The assump-
tion underlying our strategy is that conditional on changes
in observable variables, the change in training intensity of
those ﬁrms that do not change union status equals the
change in training intensity of those ﬁrms that do change
union status, had they not changed. Using the notation
above, this assumption implies that
EjtUjt  1,Xjt  EjtUjt  0,Xjt. (1)
While we acknowledge that this strategy may not fully
eliminate the selection problem, we would like to stress that
it improves on the existing literature—which typically uses
only cross-sectional variation in the ﬁrm’s or the worker’s
union status and, due to data constraints, controls for fewer
observable ﬁrm and worker characteristics.17
OLS results. Before we present results using the
difference-in-difference strategy outlined above, we display
results from OLS regressions that successively control for
more and more ﬁrm and worker characteristics as a baseline
(table 3, panel A). We report results for two dependent
variables, the proportion of apprentices (row 1) and a
dummy variable indicating that a ﬁrm trains apprentices
(row 2). To make sure that changes in the coefﬁcient are
driven by the additional controls and not by changes in the
sample size, we keep the number of observations constant
17 Some papers use plausibly exogenous variation in the minimum wage
over time and across regions to analyze the impact of wage ﬂoors on
training (for example, Neumark & Wascher, 2001; Acemoglu & Pischke,
2003). So far, however, these studies lead to conﬂicting results.
TABLE 3.—ARE UNIONIZED FIRMS MORE LIKELY TO TRAIN APPRENTICES?
Panel A: OLS Estimates
Firm Size 	 Year Firm Characteristics
Firm and Worker
Characteristics
Coef StdE Coef StdE Coef StdE
1: Proportion apprentices 0.029 (0.002)** 0.028 (0.002)** 0.027 (0.002)**
N 11,174 11,174 11,174
Coef StdE Coef StdE Coef StdE
2: 1 if ﬁrm trains 0.165 (0.010)** 0.121 (0.010)** 0.116 (0.010)**
N 11,174 11,174 11,174
Panel B: Difference-in-Difference Estimates
Comparison group
Always Unionized Always Nonunionized
II II I I
1: Proportion apprentices Coef StdE Coef StdE Coef StdE Coef StdE
a: Change NU-U 0.017 (0.005)** 0.015 (0.006) 0.020 (0.007)** 0.013 (0.008)
N 6,189 4,319 1,487 942
b: Change U-NU 0.004 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003) 0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004)
N 6,782 4,743 2,080 1,366
2: 1 if ﬁrm trains Coef StdE Coef StdE Coef StdE Coef StdE
a: Change NU-U 0.088 (0.028)** 0.070 (0.035)* 0.092 (0.031)** 0.072 (0.039)
N 6,189 4,319 1,487 942
b: Change U-NU 0.01 (0.018) 0.015 (0.020) 0.003 (0.019) 0.004 (0.022)
N 6,782 4,743 2,080 1,366
Panel C: Long Differences
Comparison group
Always Unionized Always Nonunionized
II III I
1: Proportion apprentices Coef StdE Coef StdE Coef StdE Coef StdE
a: Change NU-U 0.018 (0.008)* 0.030 (0.010)** 0.022 (0.010)* 0.044 (0.013)**
N 6,073 4,233 1,371 856
b: Change U-NU 0.008 (0.005) 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.006) 0.002 (0.007)
N 6,490 4,496 1,788 1,119
Panel A reports OLS estimates of the impact of unionization on the proportion of apprentices as well as the probability that the ﬁrm trains. The ﬁrst pair of columns only controls for ﬁrm size. The second pair
of columns additionally controls for thirteen industries, state, investment and revenue per worker, number of new hires, proﬁt evaluation, and age of the ﬁrm. We then add the proportion of qualiﬁed workers, the
average age of workers, the average daily wage of workers, and the proportion of females. Panel B reports difference-in-difference estimates for ﬁrms that switch from being nonunionized to unionized (NU-U) or
from being unionized to nonunionized (U-NU), using ﬁrms that are always or never unionized as a control group. Speciﬁcation I includes year dummies and changes in ﬁrm size, in investment and revenue per
worker, in the number of new hires, and in the evaluation of proﬁt. Speciﬁcation II includes in addition changes in the proportion of qualiﬁed workers, in the average age of workers, in the average daily wage,
and in the proportion of females. In panel C, we report “long” difference-in-difference estimates that exclude the year in which the union change took place; same speciﬁcation as in panel B. Results are based on
sample A. * and ** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
TRAINING AND UNION WAGES 371across speciﬁcations. Our conclusions are unchanged when
we let the number of observations vary across speciﬁca-
tions.
In the ﬁrst set of columns, we control for year dummies
as well as ﬁrm size in a ﬂexible manner.18 The estimate
indicates that the proportion of apprentices is 2.9 percentage
points larger in unionized ﬁrms, compared with the raw
difference of 3.6 percentage points. We then include a large
number of ﬁrm characteristics: the number of new hires, the
revenue per worker, the total investment per worker, the age
of the ﬁrm, and industry and region dummies. The coefﬁ-
cient on the union status hardly changes. In the third set of
columns, we control in addition for characteristics of the
ﬁrm’s workforce, like the ratio of qualiﬁed workers, the
ratio of females, and the average daily salary. Including
these variables does not affect the overall coefﬁcient esti-
mate. Our conclusions are unchanged when our dependent
variable is merely an indicator of whether the ﬁrm trains
apprentices. After controlling for ﬁrm and worker charac-
teristics (third set of columns), unionized ﬁrms are 11
percentage points more likely to train apprentices than
nonunionized ﬁrms.
Difference-in-difference estimates. Next, we identify
the impact of unions on training using ﬁrms that change
their union status. In our sample, 8.9% (567) of ﬁrms
change their union status once, 4.3% twice, and 0.9% three
times. We discard in the following those ﬁrms that change
union status more than once. Of those ﬁrms that change
union status once, 71.4% (405 ﬁrms) change from being
unionized to being nonunionized, and 28.5% (162 ﬁrms)
from being nonunionized to being unionized.
Figure 2 provides some ﬁrst evidence that changes in the
union status are related to changes in apprenticeship train-
ing. The ﬁgure plots the proportion of apprentices against
the number of years before and after the change in union
status, for ﬁrms that change from being nonunionized to
being unionized (NU-U), and for ﬁrms that change from
being unionized to nonunionized (U-NU). The ﬁrst year of
the new status is the zero line. The fraction of apprentices
increases substantially when ﬁrms change from being non-
unionized to being unionized, and decreases for ﬁrms that
change from being unionized to being nonunionized. The
ﬁgure also shows that the change in the fraction of appren-
tices starts before the actual change in union status, and
continues after the change. This is not surprising, given that
a change in union status is likely to be a long-term decision
that may be planned in advance. Moreover, as apprentice-
ship training takes between two and three years, ﬁrms
cannot reduce their apprentice training program immedi-
ately, and the proportion of apprentices should decline
gradually, as is suggested in the ﬁgure.
Panel B of table 3 displays estimation results from our
difference-in-difference estimator, conditional on a large set
of observable ﬁrm and worker characteristics. Again, we
report results for two dependent variables: the proportion of
apprentices (row 1) and an indicator variable that is equal to
1 if the ﬁrm trains apprentices (row 2). We present two
speciﬁcations: speciﬁcation I includes time dummies, and
18 We include ﬁrm size and ﬁrm size dummies (0–50, 51–200, 201–800,
and  800) and allow the impact of ﬁrm size to change linearly within
each of the categories.
FIGURE 2.—PROPORTION OF APPRENTICES TRAINED AND CHANGE IN UNION STATUS
The ﬁgure plots the share of apprentices in ﬁrms that switch from the union to the nonunion sector (U-NU) as well as ﬁrms that switch from the nonunion to the union sector (NU-U), before and after the switch.
Results are based on sample A.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 372changes in ﬁrm size, in investment per worker, in revenue
per worker, in the number of new hires, and in evaluation of
proﬁts. Speciﬁcation II includes, in addition to these,
changes in the proportion of qualiﬁed workers, in the
average daily wage, and in the proportion of females.19 The
ﬁrst four columns report results where ﬁrms that are non-
unionized in all periods are the comparison group; the last
four columns use ﬁrms that are unionized throughout as a
comparison group.
We ﬁrst report results for ﬁrms that change from being
nonunionized to unionized (row 1a, NU-U). The estimate
indicates that unionization signiﬁcantly increases the pro-
portion of apprentices by 1.7 percentage points, although
the point estimate is somewhat smaller than our OLS
estimate of 2.8 percentage points (panel A). Adding
(changes in) worker characteristics and the work council
variable or using ﬁrms that are always unionized as a
control group hardly changes the results. In the next row
(1b, U-NU) we report results for ﬁrms that change from
being unionized to not being unionized. Coefﬁcient esti-
mates are now smaller, and, although having the expected
sign, not signiﬁcantly different from 0. This is not surpris-
ing, for two reasons. First, the decline in apprenticeship
program size should be gradual, as apprenticeship program
usually last three years. Second, even after a ﬁrm has left the
unionized sector, union agreements continue to be binding
for at least another six months. Our ﬁndings are similar if
we use an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm
trains as our dependent variable (rows 2a and 2b).
In order to take account of the possibly gradual adapta-
tion of apprenticeship training, as has been suggested by
ﬁgure 2, we next construct “long” differences, and exclude
the year in which a change took place. Hence, we compare
the year before a change with the year after a change.As our
observation period is only ﬁve years, this reduces our
sample of ﬁrms that change status. We report results for
speciﬁcations I and II in panel C of table 3. For ﬁrms that
switch from the nonunionized to the unionized sector (row
1a), point estimates tend to be somewhat larger. For ﬁrms
that change from being unionized to nonunionized, results
are similar to our baseline difference-in-difference estimates
(row 1b).
We have conducted a number of robustness checks.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) exclude ﬁrms in the con-
struction sector from their empirical analysis, for two rea-
sons. First, ﬁrms in this industry that do not train appren-
tices have to pay a ﬁne that is then redistributed to ﬁrms in
the industry that do train. Second, there is a minimum wage
that applies to all ﬁrms in the construction industry. Our
results are similar when we eliminate ﬁrms in the construc-
tion sector from our analysis.Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)
also argue that training in small ﬁrms is likely to be
worker-ﬁnanced, and thus eliminate small ﬁrms from their
analysis. Excluding small ﬁrms (that is, ﬁrms with fewer
than 30 employees) yields roughly similar results to those
reported here. For instance, for ﬁrms that switch from being
nonunionized to unionized, the point estimate equals 0.010,
with a standard error of 0.004, for speciﬁcation II.
These results are supportive of our hypothesis that unions
increase training within the German apprenticeship pro-
gram. According to our preferred estimate, unionization
increases the proportion of apprentices by 1.7 percentage
points (table 3, panel B, row 1a). As the average fraction of
apprentices in ﬁrms is only 4.89% (see table 1, panelA), this
effect is sizable. We acknowledge that a causal interpreta-
tion of this estimate hinges on our identiﬁcation assumption
that changes in training intensity between ﬁrms result en-
tirely from changes in union status, not some other change.
Remember, however, that we condition on (changes in) a
large set of characteristics of the ﬁrm and the ﬁrm’s work-
force. For instance, controlling for (changes in) the propor-
tion of qualiﬁed workers should eliminate a possible bias
due to changes in the selection of workers into ﬁrms that
change union status. Further important covariates include
the (change in) ﬁrm size, wages, revenue, and investment—
all of which describe the economic situation of the ﬁrm.
D. Wage Cuts and Layoffs
Our results suggest that, because of wage compression,
unionized ﬁrms are more likely to train workers in appren-
ticeship schemes than nonunionized ﬁrms. While these
ﬁndings are clearly in line with our model, they are also
consistent with existing models of unions and training, such
as Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b). However, our richer
model allows us to derive two additional implications that
are unique to our model, and thus help to distinguish our
model from the existing models.
According to our model, wages are more compressed in
unionized ﬁrms because of wage ﬂoors that are binding in
unionized ﬁrms, but not in nonunionized ﬁrms. The two
implications we test in this section are a direct consequence
of wage ﬂoors.
First, wage ﬂoors should prevent ﬁrms from cutting
wages as a response to a negative productivity shock. We
therefore expect wage cuts to occur more frequently in
nonunionized than in unionized ﬁrms. Table 4, panel A,
provides empirical support for this hypothesis. The table
reports the estimate for the marginal effect of the ﬁrm’s
union status on the probability of a wage cut from a probit
regression, where we control for potential labor market
experience and its square, gender, log ﬁrm size, year and
industry dummies, and a dummy for metropolitan area. We
deﬁne three variables. The ﬁrst variable is equal to 1 if the
worker’s real wage decreases from one period to the next by
at least 1%, and 0 otherwise. The other two variables are
equal to 1 if the worker experiences a cut in real wages of
at least 5% or at least 10%, respectively. In our sample,
22.7% of spells experience a cut in real wages of at least
19 The number of observations is lower in this speciﬁcation because we
are able to match worker information only for the years 1996 to 1999.
TRAINING AND UNION WAGES 3731%, 9.4% of at least 5%, and 3.9% of at least 10%. We base
our analysis on sample B, but restrict our sample to workers
who stay with the same employer between two successive
periods. Due to wage censoring, we delete university grad-
uates from our sample.
The incidence of a wage cut is signiﬁcantly higher in
nonunionized than in unionized ﬁrms for both low- and
medium-skilled workers, for all three deﬁnitions. Interest-
ingly, the impact of the ﬁrm’s union status on the probability
of a wage cut tends to be stronger for the low-skilled
workers than for the medium-skilled. This suggests that the
union wage is more binding for low-skilled workers, as
expected.
A second consequence of wage ﬂoors is that layoffs
should occur more frequently in unionized than in non-
unionized ﬁrms: since unionized ﬁrms are not allowed to
pay wages below the union wage, they lay off workers who
turn out to be less productive than the union wage. At the
same time, voluntary turnover should be lower in unionized
than in nonunionized ﬁrms since workers who are paid the
union wage in unionized ﬁrms earn a higher wage than they
would in a nonunionized ﬁrm. We test this implication by
comparing the probability of a layoff and voluntary job
quits after apprenticeship training in the two types of ﬁrms,
using our sample of workers who completed apprenticeship
training in one of the ﬁrms in our ﬁrm panel (sample C).
Unfortunately, we do not observe whether workers who
leave the training ﬁrm were laid off or left the ﬁrm because
they received better offers. We do, however, observe
whether workers experience an unemployment spell after
leaving the training ﬁrm, and our results below are based on
this distinction. We were able to show that, if we observe a
higher job-to-unemployment and a lower job-to-job quit
rate in unionized ﬁrms, then it must be the case that workers
in unionized ﬁrms are more likely to be laid off and less
likely to quit.20 In our sample, 9.4% of workers become
unemployed after apprenticeship training, and 17.8% move
to another ﬁrm without an intervening unemployment spell.
Panel B of table 4 reports coefﬁcients from linear prob-
ability models of the impact of the ﬁrm’s union status on the
probability that a traince becomes unemployed after com-
pleting training (columns 1–3), and on the probability that
she moves from one job to another (columns 4–6). Results
in column 1 and 4 condition on time dummies only. In line
with our hypothesis, apprentices from unionized ﬁrms are
less likely to move from job to job. However, contrary to
our hypothesis, they are also less likely to move into
unemployment. These coefﬁcients may simply reﬂect that,
as implied by our model, unionized ﬁrms employ more able
workers than nonunionized ﬁrms, and more able workers
are less likely to switch ﬁrms, and in particular less likely to
become unemployed after apprenticeship training.21 Fur-
thermore, unionized ﬁrms may be of higher quality than
nonunionized ﬁrms and thus lay off fewer workers after
apprenticeship training.
To account for differences in ﬁrm and worker quality, we
next control for the size and industry of the training ﬁrm, as
well as for the following worker characteristics: age and age
squared, gender, the log of the apprenticeship duration, and
20 This follows under two assumptions: First, laid-off workers are more
likely to become unemployed than workers who quit voluntarily. Second,
conditional on a layoff or a quit, otherwise identical workers from
unionized and nonunionized ﬁrms have the same probability of becoming
unemployed. Both assumptions are reasonable; for example, see Nagypal
(2008) for empirical evidence of the former.
21 There are several theoretical models that predict a lower ability of
job-to-unemployment movers, including the asymmetric information
models by Gibbons and Katz (1991), Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), and
Scho ¨nberg (2007). Von Wachter and Bender (2006) provide convincing
evidence that apprentices who leave the training ﬁrm are of lower ability
than workers who stay with the training ﬁrm.
TABLE 4.—UNIONIZATION AND WAGE FLOORS:W AGE CUTS AND LAYOFFS
Panel A: Unionization and Real Wage Cuts
Low-Skilled Medium-Skilled Difference Low-Medium
Coef StdE Coef StdE Coef StdE
N 21,429 237,316
a :1% 0.058 (0.014)** 0.022 (0.004)** 0.036 (0.015)*
b :5% 0.042 (0.010)** 0.018 (0.003)** 0.024 (0.011)*
c: 10 % 0.015 (0.007)** 0.006 (0.002)** 0.009 (0.007)
Panel B: Unionization and Layoffs













Training Firm Unionized 0.049 0.020 0.018 0.015 0.019 0.021
(0.005)** (0.005)** (0.008)* (0.006)* (0.006)** (0.011)*
N 93,678 89,056 89,056 93,678 89,056 89,056
Panel A reports the marginal impact of unionization on the probability of a real wage cut of at least 1%, 5%, or 10% between two successive periods, obtained from probit regressions. Results are based on sample
B where workers who switch ﬁrms between two periods are excluded. Regressions are separately estimated for the low- and medium-skilled, and control for year dummies, potential labor market experience and
its square, gender, foreign status, log ﬁrm size, metropolitan area, and thirteen industries. Panel B reports the impact of unionization on the probability of becoming unemployed and moving from job to job after
apprenticeship training. Columns 1 and 4 only control for year effects. Columns 2 and 5 additionally condition on ﬁrm size (in logs), thirteen industries, age and age squared, apprenticeship duration (in logs), high
school degree (Abitur), and gender. Columns 3 and 6 include ﬁxed ﬁrm effects. Results are based on sample C.
* and ** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 374a dummy for whether the worker has a high school degree
(Abitur, columns 2 and 5). This reduces the size of both
coefﬁcients.
However, observed characteristics may only partly take
account of unobserved worker and ﬁrm characteristics. Our
panel structure allows us to condition on ﬁxed training ﬁrm
effects, exploiting variation in the ﬁrm’s union status over
time. We report results in columns 3 and 6. Estimates now
indicate that unionization signiﬁcantly increases the proba-
bility of becoming unemployed after apprenticeship training
by 1.8 percentage points, or 19.1%, and signiﬁcantly re-
duces the probability of a job-to-job transition by 2.1 per-
centage points, or 11.8%. This suggests that workers in
unionized ﬁrms are more likely to be laid off, and less likely
to quit voluntarily, just as predicted by our model, but not by
existing models of unions and training.
V. Conclusion
This paper addresses the question of whether unions, by
imposing wage ﬂoors that lead to wage compression, in-
crease training in the economy. Our focus is on Germany,
which provides an interesting context in which to test this
hypothesis, due to its large-scale apprenticeship program
and its collective bargaining system based on voluntary
union recognition. This effectively creates a unionized and
nonunionized sector, deﬁned by the ﬁrm’s union recogni-
tion.
We develop a theoretical framework that provides a set of
testable implications. In the ﬁrst step of the empirical
analysis, we document that wages are more compressed in
unionized than in nonunionized ﬁrms, just as our model
predicts. We then show that unionized ﬁrms are more likely
to train workers in apprenticeship training than nonunion-
ized ﬁrms. In a third step, we test and empirically conﬁrm
two novel implications that are unique to our model, and do
not follow from existing models of unions and training:
wage cuts occur less frequently and layoffs more frequently
in unionized than in nonunionized ﬁrms. Overall, these
ﬁndings are consistent with our hypothesis that unions move
training closer to the socially optimal level, as they help to
overcome one particular type of market failure, the infeasi-
bility of long-term wage contracts. Thus, one role unions
may play in Germany is that they serve as a commitment
device, by guaranteeing workers at least the union wage in
the future. One implication of this ﬁnding is that the decline
in unionization rates—as witnessed by Germany over the
last decade—may have undesired consequences for the
apprenticeship system.
Contrary to the prediction of our model, we also ﬁnd that
nonunionized ﬁrms train apprentices. This suggests that
wage compression due to unions are an important, but not
the only, reason for ﬁrm-ﬁnanced apprenticeship training in
Germany. Our analysis is thus compatible with earlier work
by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) that proposes asymmetric
information as an important reason for why ﬁrms sponsor
training in Germany.
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